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Pension Policy in EU25 
and its Possible Impact 
on Elderly Poverty1 
by Asghar Zaidi
This policy brief reviews the most recent changes in pension policies in 
EU25 and provides a description of how these policy reforms might affect 
the risk of poverty for elderly populations. The analyses shed light on the 
expected evolution of poverty among the elderly for coming decades. 
These insights are also useful to identify key policy responses that might 
be necessary in order to meet the objectives of not only sustainability but 
also adequacy of pensions in the European Union. 
At the outset, it is useful to note that the current period of pension re-
forms is driven mainly by increased concerns over the impact of popula-
tion ageing and a need for ﬁscal consolidation. 
A common trend is that the generosity of pension beneﬁts drawn from 
the public pension systems is on the decline, and thus the average pub-
lic pension beneﬁt ratio could drop. Moreover systematic reforms have 
changed the nature of pension provision from deﬁned beneﬁt type provi-
sion to deﬁned contribution type provision. In general, this type of change 
shifts more risks towards individuals concerned (of the same generation), 
and results in a more restrictive redistribution to the lower income indi-
viduals.
Pension policy in EU countries: 
An overview2
The pensions landscape in Europe is changing fast. For the purpose of the 
analyses presented here, the pension reforms that have taken place can be 
broadly classiﬁed into two broad sets: 
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• The parametric reforms, which have maintained unchanged the 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) nature of existing pension systems but made 
substantial changes to their underlying rules – such as the rules on 
the accrual of pension entitlements, the age at which beneﬁts can be 
drawn, and the contribution periods required. 
• Other countries have gone even further and opted for sys-
 tematic reforms, i.e. moving from the PAYG deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) 
structure and adopting new deﬁned-contribution (DC) type schemes. 
For systematic reforms, one can distinguish two main types of reforms: 
World-Bank inspired multi-pillar reforms that set up systems of funded 
personal accounts (e.g. Slovak Republic, Estonia and Hungary) and the 
adoption of Non-Financial Deﬁned Contribution (NDC) systems (e.g. 
Sweden, Italy, Poland and Latvia). 
Note here that the two biggest countries in Europe, Germany and 
France, have not shifted to NDC (and thus they are categorised as 
countries which had parametric reforms), but have introduced features 
that mimic in some respect NDC systems. France has introduced a link 
between the number of contribution years and life expectancy while 
Germany has adopted a sustainability factor that links the level of pen-
sion beneﬁts to the dependency ratio. In the same vein, Austria has also 
signiﬁcantly modiﬁed its public pension plans and could be said to now 
have a personal notional deﬁned beneﬁt account system.
Parametric reforms:  
Scope and possible impact
Most countries in the EU25 have opted to enact parametric reforms 
rather than systematic reforms. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that the former have a smaller impact on pensioner incomes than the 
latter. In fact, their impact on ﬁscal sustainability and pensioner welfare 
can be equally impressive, or even more in some instances (e.g. while 
the replacement ratio is expected to decline by 11% in Hungary, which 
has gone for systematic reform, that in France is set to fall by 26%). The 
main difference between parametric and systematic reform lies not in the 
ﬁnancial impact on pensioners (or contributors) but in the shouldering of 
risk between the current generation and the State (who becomes a cus-
todian of future generations in this respect). The fact that the parametric 
reforms do not change public pension systems from a DB to a DC set-up 
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has several important implications. The longevity risk is still borne by 
the pension provider rather than the pensioner, and redistribution is still 
possible under a DB system, something that is relatively more difﬁcult to 
achieve under a pure DC framework. 
            
Parametric reforms may affect either the contribution side or the beneﬁt 
side. Almost all countries in the EU25 have undertaken parametric re-
forms during the last decade, and in some cases this preceded systematic 
reforms. 
• On the contribution side, countries may change the percentage of 
income that needs to be paid or the income thresholds that apply. 
They may change the length of contributions required to qualify for a 
pension. The state pension age, or the minimum age at which a pension 
starts to be paid out, can also be modiﬁed. 
• On the beneﬁt side, an important parametric change is a change in 
the indexation or uprating of pension beneﬁts. Also, Governments may 
change the beneﬁt formula by modifying the accrual rates or altering 
the pensionable earnings. Many countries have also tried to rollback 
the early retirement schemes and also sought to extend working 
lives by offering beneﬁts to older people who continued to work or 
deferred their pensions.    
 
Table 1 below summarises the main parametric reforms that have taken 
place, or are gradually being introduced, in the PAYG DB public pension 
schemes of the current 25 Member States. The parametric reforms are 
sub-divided into 5 categories. In some cases, some countries that have 
made systematic reforms are also listed in the table, e.g. Italy. This is be-
cause in these countries the old schemes still apply to older cohorts of 
workers, and Governments have also sought to reform them. In general, 
the parametric reforms have been driven by the objective of increasing 
revenues or decreasing generosity in terms of annual pension beneﬁts 
paid out, and thus they are likely to have a negative impact on incomes of 
pensioners.
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Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
U.K.
Retirement age: 
The most frequent reform was changing the retirement age. In most 
EU25, the reform has involved the equalisation of the legal retirement 
age for men and women (as per ruling by the European Court of Justice). 
Only Eastern European New Member State countries (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovak Republic, Lithuania) and Italy have ef-
Table 1: 
Countries that made 
parametric reforms 
between 1995/96 and 2005
Source: 
Based on analysis of ‘Social Programmes 
throughout the World’, various editions, 
and ‘MISSOC Tables’, various years. 
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fectively increased the retirement age for both genders, while Denmark 
actually lowered it from 67 to 65. The coalition Government in Germany 
intends to raise the state pension age from 65 to 67. Similarly, independ-
ent Government-appointed pension commissions have recently recom-
mended the extension of the retirement age in both the UK and Malta. 
Contribution rate: 
The second most common reform during this decade was modifying the 
contribution rate. Given the PAYG-nature of public schemes, this reform, 
on its own, does not yield full beneﬁts. In contrast, some countries, e.g., 
the Netherlands and Sweden have even set a cap on contributions. 
Contribution requirement: 
One of the most common changes has been the scaling back of the early 
retirement schemes that had been put in place in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Contribution requirements for early retirement, or deductions for taking 
up pensions before the legal retirement age, have gone up in Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Finland, the Czech and the 
Slovak Republics, Spain and Slovenia. More crucially, the period of mini-
mum contributions needed to qualify for the maximum pension has been 
increased or is being raised in several countries, like Austria, Belgium, 
France and Italy. France has also introduced a signiﬁcant reform under 
which after 2009, the number of contribution years will increase in line 
with the increases in life expectancy.
Beneﬁt indexation: 
On the beneﬁt side, more countries moved away from earnings uprat-
ing of pensions in payment; most EU countries now uprate beneﬁts with 
prices – implying that over time pensioner beneﬁts will fall in relation to 
general incomes and thus they will lose out their relative position in  
society. As can be seen in Table 1, there have only been a handful of 
countries that have recently changed the way they index beneﬁts after 
retirement – this may be somewhat deceptive, as most countries had 
already effected these changes at an earlier date. There were only a few 
countries in the Union who had still earnings uprating in 1995, but since 
have moved away. Austria and Germany had at ﬁrst moved towards net 
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earnings, so that the burden of any increases in social security contri-
butions would be shared between workers and pensioners. Now they 
have both moved to an even less generous indexation: Austria to price 
uprating and Germany has introduced the ‘sustainability factor’ to adjust 
pension beneﬁt indexation. Other countries, like Hungary and the Slovak 
Republic, went for the Swiss formula (50% price uprating and 50% earn-
ings uprating) and in this way reduced what were previously wage-in-
dexed pensions. 
Pension formula – accrual side: 
Changes in the pension beneﬁt formula are rather more complex re-
forms, especially in terms of their implications being fully understood by 
the average citizen. There are a wide variety of pension beneﬁt formulae 
and thus it is hard to synthesise the main changes. However, broadly 
speaking, the formulae can be divided into two parts – accrual of entitle-
ments and pensionable salary. The accrual side determines how much 
of the pensionable salary the pension beneﬁt will be replacing. Thus, 
for instance, the scheme could be based on having an accrual of 2% of 
the ﬁnal salary for every year of contribution. The other component, 
pensionable salary, amounts to the representative salary to which the 
earnings-related scheme is linked. Typically DB schemes (particularly in 
the private sector) have accrual schedules that are related linearly to the 
number of years in the system (i.e. same accrual rates for each year of 
contribution, irrespective of age and years already contributed for). In 
order to extend working lives, or alternatively to discourage early retire-
ment, in recent years some Governments, such as Finland and Greece, 
have modiﬁed their accrual rates and tried to give higher entitlement to 
those who work after certain ages, or else have sought to make people 
work more by reducing accrual rates. In other cases, the accrual rate may 
differ on the basis of earnings (Czech Republic and Portugal have higher 
accrual rates on lower earnings, and lower accrual rates on higher earn-
ings; France and Sweden have higher accrual rates on higher earnings). 
There are also differences in accrual rates across sectors (e.g. ﬁre-ﬁght-
ers’ pension schemes in the UK, and the pension schemes for the police 
in Greece, have much higher accrual rates compared to other sectors in 
the economy; the French pension system has separate accrual regimes 
for executives and nonexecutives). 
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Pension formula – pensionable salary side: 
A more readily understandable parametric reform involves changing the 
pensionable salary. Most countries used to have schemes that limited the 
determination of this salary to the ﬁnal few years of a career, a period 
when someone would be near the top of his earnings history. However, 
in recent years, there has been a considerable lengthening of this period, 
so that the wage that is replaced is in many cases no longer very repre-
sentative of the ﬁnal salary of the person before he retires. Austria, for 
example, has moved away from using 15 best years to the income earned 
during 40 to 45 years of working lives. Most notably, this kind of reform 
is likely to harm more those who had steep earnings careers, but may 
not be any more beneﬁcial to those on low-income trajectory. Other 
countries, like Portugal and Hungary, have also gone towards calculating 
the pensionable income as the average lifetime salary, while others, such 
as France, have just increased this period to be more in line with the re-
quired contribution periods. Germany introduced a ‘sustainability factor’ 
which links annual pension indexing to changes in the ratio of pension-
ers to workers supporting the system. German pensions are tied to a 
basic pension-point value component, which, in turn, is indexed to annual 
net wage growth. This pension-point value component is adjusted in line 
with the sustainability factor, so to lower pension payouts for all German 
retirees as the pensioner-to-worker ratio increases over time. 
As a result of the majority of the changes described above, pension 
payments are expected to be on the decline, which in turn is likely to 
raise the risk of elderly falling back on the means-tested social assistance 
(where available) or fall into poverty. 
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Systematic reforms and their possible 
impact
In essence there have been two broad types of systematic reforms 
– those inspired by the World-Bank multi-pillar model and those setting 
up NDC schemes. Though in both cases, the main difference with DB 
public schemes is that the structure of determination of pension beneﬁts 
changes from DB to DC, there are some major differences between the 
two strands of reform and their impact on pensioners’ incomes is also 
likely to be quite distinct.
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Estonia
Hungary
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania (voluntary)
Poland
Slovak Republic
Slovenia (supplement)
Sweden
World-Bank multi-pillar reforms
Prior to accession, a number of countries opted to go for multi-pillar 
pension systems, often after assistance from the World Bank. The new 
systems face serious challenges, with major issues surrounding coverage, 
high ﬁscal costs of transition and negative impact on certain groups 
(such as women). 
Table 2: 
Countries that have made 
systematic reforms
Source: 
Based on Commission Staff Working 
Document: Synthesis report on adequate 
and sustainable pensions (Feb 2006).
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Poland, Estonia, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, Lithuania and Hungary all 
implemented multi-pillar reforms before they joined the EU (and three 
other applicant countries, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia have also gone 
down this path). In general the multi-pillar reforms are still too new 
for their long-term impacts to be evident. Yet, in some of the countries 
that went through the reform earlier than others, e.g. Hungary, there 
have been studies that have yielded some interesting insights. A working 
paper published by the Hungarian Central Bank3 notes that ‘the pen-
sion system, in its present form, is unsustainable with net implicit public 
liabilities in the system around 240% of GDP’. More crucially it notes 
that ‘the returns recorded so far in the private pension funds fall short 
of expectations and, on the condition that these low returns persist, the 
second pillar is projected to provide annuities that do not make up for 
the reduction in beneﬁts received from the public pillar’.  The Hungar-
ian case is also interesting in that it shows that a move to full fund-
ing does not automatically result in sustainability as after the reform 
several parametric changes contributed to reverse any improvements in 
sustainability. The net implicit liabilities of the system had been just 60% 
of GDP prior to the reform, but a cut in contribution rates, the level-
ling of beneﬁts across pensioners who retired in different years and the 
introduction of a 13th month pension contributed to boost the burden 
of the system.
Shifting to a pure DC structure increases risks shouldered by individual 
contributors (instead of the State, or the employer), and it can reduce 
the redistributive element present in public DB pension schemes. Given 
gender differentials in employment, it also tends to lead to greater 
gender inequality. Personal accounts reforms introduce two elements 
of risk to pensioner incomes – namely investment risk and administra-
tive charges risk, and these may lead beneﬁts to be signiﬁcantly different 
from those available under the old regime of public DB-type pension 
schemes. The move to DC also implied that contributions and beneﬁts 
of an individual became directly linked and this reduces the possibili-
ties of redistribution. Thus, such a move was negative for lower income 
individuals, as progressive elements in pension formulae were removed 
or decreased, cases in point being Hungary (1998) and Poland (1992 
and 1999). Moreover the shift from DB to DC means that the longevity 
risk is shifted squarely to the shoulders of individual contributors of the 
same generation (and not borne by the State). Taken together all these 
measures tend to disadvantage those with low lifetime earnings. To 
further complicate matters, though countries have tended to legislate 
that gender-neutral mortality tables are utilised, there have been practi-
3 Gabor Orban and Daniel Palotai,
‘The sustainability of the Hungarian
pension system: a reassessment’,
Magyar Nemzeti Bank, December 2005.
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cal problems of implementing these annuity regulations with insurance 
companies reluctant to offer them and the market proving to be difﬁcult 
to kick-start. Thus, the net outcome of these reforms increases the risk 
that women will continue to have lower annual pension incomes. 
A further complication arises when individuals are given the option to 
shift voluntarily into the personal accounts system. Evidence from Poland 
and Hungary indicates that many opted to shift without having recourse 
to enough information. In many cases, people above a given age had the 
option of staying within the old public DB-type PAYG system or move 
to the personal accounts pillar. Similar to what happened in the UK 
with contracting-out, there is evidence that in many cases people who 
switched may have become less well off as a result. A World Bank study 
carried out in 20004 based on surveys in Poland from the end of 1999 
indicate that ‘most people felt they were well informed and that informa-
tion on the pension reform was readily available’, but then surveys often 
showed ‘that the knowledge of the pension system was limited to slogans 
rather than a deep understanding’. Moreover while there are indications 
of rational switching, there is ‘some evidence that choices made were 
not based on a detailed understanding of the new system’. The study also 
notes that ‘a signiﬁcant proportion of people simply joined the pension 
fund of the ﬁrst agent they came across’. 
NDC schemes
Lower investment risks: 
Whereas the personal account systems are based on investing funds in 
the ﬁnancial market, the NDC systems involve just notional accounts and 
thus the investment risk faced by individuals is very different. The rate 
of return faced under an NDC is centrally determined and reﬂects the 
formula chosen, whereas under the personal accounts system the return 
depends on the choices made by individuals and the performance and 
stability of ﬁnancial markets. This has signiﬁcant implications in that all 
people face the same risks on return under the NDC scheme, and thus 
there is no income inequality that results because of better investment 
choices, something that could possibly be correlated to the income level 
of an individual. NDC schemes thus do not place lower income individu-
als at a relative disadvantage arising from their relatively lower level of 
ﬁnancial education and experience in investment choices. That said NDC 
4 Agnieszka Chlon-Dominczak,
‘Pension reform and public information 
in Poland’,
Social Protection Discussion Paper Series, 
World Bank, August 2000.
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schemes also have a form of ‘investment’ risk for contributors, which 
relates to any ﬂuctuations in the notional rate of return that differs from 
the return under the PAYG DB scheme. The NDC schemes, in fact, at-
tempt to make the PAYG schemes automatically stabilising so that the 
‘assets’ and ‘liabilities’ of the system balance out. For instance, in Sweden 
through the ‘automatic balance mechanism’, the Government reviews 
the system annually and if the calculation reveals an unfunded liability, 
the notional account interest (set at the growth of average wages) and 
the indexing of annuities are reduced. Thus changes in the size of the 
contributing labour force are reﬂected in the rate of return earned on 
funds. With the NDC system, the ﬁnancial risk of changing economic and 
demographic factors is shifted from the State to the contributors. 
Annuity divisor: 
The NDC systems also adjust for longevity increases through changes in 
the annuity divisor, which converts the notional account upon retirement 
into pension beneﬁts. As retirees’ life span increases, the monthly beneﬁt 
available to individuals declines unless they delay retirement. Capretta 
(2006) reports that “based on mid-range demographic and economic 
assumptions, the Government projects that the life span adjustment will 
cut average monthly beneﬁts for those continuing to retire at age 65 by 
14% by 2055”. However, this may be compensated (albeit only partly) 
by behavioural adjustments (upwards) in the age at which people retire 
when faced with the prospect of low pension beneﬁts and rising life ex-
pectancy. Moreover, as mentioned by Capretta, “the Government expects 
the automatic balance mechanism to be triggered only ‘a few times’ over 
the next 15 years, thus modestly cutting the rate of return applied to 
the notional accounts”.5 There is concern that the projections used by 
the Swedish Government may be optimistic (the current level of fertility 
and migration together with 2% permanent real wage growth) and the 
automatic balance mechanism will be used much more frequently than 
expected. In this case, the political acceptability of the NDC system may 
be put under threat as its transparency means that individuals will be able 
to compare the rate of return on their notional accounts with that on 
market instruments (and ignoring the question of risk, charges, etc). This 
will put pressure on Governments to sustain the system by shouldering 
part of the change in economic and demographic factors itself. 
5 James C. Capretta, 
“Building automatic solvency into
US Social Security:
Insights from Sweden and Germany”, 
Policy Brief No.151, 
The Brookings Institution, March 2006
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Securitisation of pensions: 
As noted in Knell (2005)6 the NDC system leads to a securitisation of 
pension claims, making individual beneﬁt levels difﬁcult to modify whereas 
under the DB systems where beneﬁts were determined at the end of 
the career, it was easier to modify the formula. However, the shift to 
NDC in itself, due to the move towards lifetime averaging and the shift 
of longevity risk, may lead to such a reduction in beneﬁts. For instance, 
Franco and Sartor (2006)7 report that in the Italian system “under the 
baseline scenario, the average pension earned at the age of 60 is reduced 
by 34 percent…, and the reduction in beneﬁts reaches 50 percent if the 
lifetime stream of pension beneﬁts is taken into account”. These reduc-
tions in beneﬁts, if not compensated by additional contributions, are likely 
to increase the risk of elderly poverty. 
Lower administration costs: 
Another major difference of the NDC schemes is that they are generally 
less expensive to administer than multi-pillar pension systems. This is not 
to say that multi-pillar systems cannot be organised in a way that reduces 
the administrative charges faced by contributors. The Swedish pension 
system also includes a relatively small personal account component (2.5 
percentage points out of the total 18.5% contribution paid) which due to 
its centralised organisation faces low administrative costs, indicating that 
this type of risk can be reduced through reforms that decrease decen-
tralisation. Nevertheless the personal account systems will always involve 
more administrative costs as they involve the actual management and 
investment of funds, and thus even if contributors are denied any rights 
of switching providers or are given very little choice (both factors that 
could reduce administrative charges substantially) there would be the 
costs to effect investments, track them and administer them. Given that 
these are often ﬁxed costs, in a system of personal accounts these costs 
tend to disadvantage the lower income groups. 
6 Markus Knell, 
“Demographic ﬂuctuations, sustainability 
factors and intergenerational fairness – an 
assessment of Austria’s new pension sys-
tem’, Monetary Policy and the Economy 
Q1/05, Österreichische Nationalbank, 
2005. 
7 Daniele Franco and Nicola Sartor, 
‘NDCs in Italy: Unsatisfactory present, 
uncertain future’, from ‘Pension Reform: 
Issues and Prospects for Non-ﬁnancial 
Deﬁned Contribution (NDC) Schemes’ 
edited by Robert Holzmann and Edward 
Palmer,  The World Bank, 2006.
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Gender-neutral annuity calculations: 
The adoption of the gender-neutral annuity is arguably the most redis-
tributive element of a DC-type system. However, this is true only when 
one looks at the overall cumulative sum of pensions payment. In terms of 
annual incomes, and thus poverty risk, the gender-speciﬁc risk of elderly 
poverty will not be affected by gender-neutral annuity rates.
Pension crediting for absences from work: 
The shift to DC, and the determination of beneﬁts by the amount of 
funds accumulated, make it crucial to have in place adequate crediting 
systems for periods during which an individual is prevented by circum-
stances, such as sickness, unemployment, training or child and adult car-
ing, from contributing. However, there is evidence that in many cases this 
element of reform was underestimated. For instance, Steinhilber (2004) 
reports that in Hungary contributors to the personal accounts system 
contribute 6% of their child care beneﬁt to the pension system (instead 
of having credits as under the old system) and since this beneﬁt is much 
less than wages, especially for middle and upper income earners, carers 
are worse off, and that in Poland the State pays a subsidy but this is based 
on the minimum wage and is ‘much less generous than it was before’. By 
contrast in Sweden, the State gives extra pension rights to parents with 
children under four, though Sweden’s 2005 National Strategy Report for 
adequate and sustainable pensions still stated that while “in principle, the 
national pension system gives everyone the same possibilities of building 
an adequate pension…many women still devote more time to unpaid 
work and less time to paid work than men, which results in lower aver-
age pensions for women”. 
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Conclusion 
The above analyses describe brieﬂy the pension reforms that have taken 
place during the last decade or so in the present 25 Member States of 
the European Union. While in 1995, nearly all the Member States of the 
EU had an earnings-related DB PAYG scheme as the main centrepiece of 
their pension system, by 2005 nearly half of the Member States had re-
formed their pension systems. In most cases reforms were mainly driven 
by demographic pressures and ﬁscal sustainability concerns and the im-
pact of these reforms on income adequacy and pensioner poverty does 
not always appear to have been given sufﬁcent assessment. In particular, 
the effects on particular groups, such as women and lower income earn-
ers, have not been assessed in great depth. The research reported here 
takes a ﬁrst step in that direction. 
These issues point towards the need to reassess most of the reforms 
that have been carried out and outline those that are less likely to result 
in pensioner poverty. For instance, France’s reform to link the number of 
contribution years required to qualify for the state pension with longevity 
may be less socially risky than Germany’s policy to link the value of pen-
sion beneﬁts to the dependency ratio. This is mainly because this policy 
sends clear signals to individuals that they need to work more to qualify 
for the same beneﬁt, rather than simply giving them a smaller beneﬁt and 
then possibly facing a political backlash and having to increase this beneﬁt. 
The same clarity of incentive signals to work more is also achieved in 
the NDC systems. Similarly the administrative structure adopted by the 
multi-pillar reforms in the Eastern European Member States needs to be 
looked at and reformed in a way so as to reduce administrative costs and 
make the systems less burdensome on low-income earners. Moreover 
policy-makers need to ensure that individuals understand the choices 
before them, particularly the longevity risk, and that incentives for sav-
ings must increase. Policy-makers need to remember that pensions were 
not introduced by chance, but were the result of social consensus that 
poverty amongst the elderly must be eliminated. If pension systems end 
up failing this main task, it is very probable that they will be forced to 
unravel some of the recent reforms that have taken place.
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